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NOTES
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw-Electric Utility Rate Regulation: Regulat
ing the Shock: Abandonment of Nuclear Power Plant Construction
Attorney General v. Department ofPublic Utilities, 390 Mass. 208, 455
N.E. 2d 414 (1983).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1981, ten years after they had initiated the Pilgrim II nuclear
power plant project, I Boston Edison Company's Board of Directors
voted to abandon all efforts to build it. 2
On October 16, 1981, Boston Edison Company (Edison) filed a
revised rate schedule 3 with the Massachusetts Department of Public
1. In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 433 (Mass. Dep't of
Pub. Util. 1982). Edison initially intended the Pilgrim II facility to fulfill a forecasted
growth in demand for electricity. When this estimated growth did not materialize, the
incentive shifted to reducing Edison's 65% dependence upon oil for the production of elec
tricity. Boston Edison Co., D.P.U. Order No. 19494, at 191 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Uti!.
September 22, 1981).
2. Attorney Gen. v. Department of Pub. Uti!., 390 Mass. 208, 210, 455 N.E.2d 414,
415 (1983). Edison asserted that the accident at Three Mile Island caused the regulatory
delay in licensing Edison to build Pilgrim II and that the delay led to the cancellation.
Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Uti!. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 449 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Uti!.
1982). It recognized licensing delays as a factor. It also cited the company's inability to
finance the project to completion as a cause of abandonment. Id. at 470.
3. In Massachusetts, public utilities may obtain an increase in the amount recovered
from retail ratepayers by filing a revised schedule of rates with the Massachusetts Depart
ment of Public Utilities. After a public utility proposes an increase, the Department must
hold a public hearing and examine the advisability of the increase. Pursuant to its ratemak
ing authority, the Department may delay effectiveness of the proposed prices no longer
than ten months from the earliest date on which the new amount might otherwise become
effective. The Department incorporates any required changes into the schedule. MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 94 (West 1976).
Within the scope of public utility ratemaking, two distinct areas exist in which the
Department makes binding judgments. The first deals with the total amount recoverable
from the ratepayers. The second involves the allocation of the amount among different
classes of users - residential, commercial and industrial - usually on the basis of the cost
of service to each class. See Jones, Judicial Determination 0/ Public Utility Rates: A Cri
tique, 54 B.U.L. REV. 873, 875 (1974). This note focuses on the first area only because of
the two step process of decisionmaking. Once the regulatory agency allows recovery of
nuclear power plant abandonment losses, the agency combines the recoverable amount
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Utilities (Department).4 Edison hoped to recoup its net investment,
estimated at $278.3 million, in the Pilgrim II nuclear power plant pro
ject through the rate increase. 5
On April 30, 1982, the Department decided to allow Edison to
recover a portion of its total abandonment losses6 through an increase
in rates as a cost of providing electricity. 7 Each year for thirteen years
beginning May 1, 1982, Edison's ratepayers will pay $12,500,000.00
more for their electricity than if Edison had never begun the Pilgrim II
project. 8
The Massachusetts Attorney General appealed the Department's
decision,9 asserting that the Department did not have the authority to
with other sources of increase; only then does the agency allocate the burden of this total
amount among the ratepayers. Id.
4. Attorney Gen. v. Department of Pub. Uti!., 390 Mass. 208, 210, 455 N.E.2d 414,
415 (1983).
5. In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 PUb. Uti!. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 434 n.77 (Mass.
Dep't of Pub. Uti!. 1982).
Edison joined with other electric companies in Massachusetts, Maine, New Hamp
shire, and Vermont in its endeavor to build Pilgrim II. The $278.3 million, therefore, rep
resents only a part of the abandonment losses. Edison was the major participant with an
intended ownership of 59 per cent. Attorney Gen. v. Department of Pub. Uti!., 390 Mass.
208,210 n.2, 455 N.E.2d 414, 415 n.2 (1983). See In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Uti!.
Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 433 n.75 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Uti!. 1982) for a complete list of
participant companies.
6. Investment in research, forecasting, engineering plans, licensing expenses, and the
costs of cancelling contracts for the purchase of fabrication materials represented the losses
of abandonment. Edison never began construction, however, if such term is defined as
groundbreaking and actual fabrication at the intended site. Telephone interview with R. K.
Gad III, Counsel for Boston Edison Co. (Nov. 23, 1983). Contra MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 164, § 69G (West 1976 & West Supp. 1984) (defining "construction"); Plymouth
County Nuclear Information Comm., Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Council, 374 Mass.
236, 238-41, 372 N.E.2d 229, 231-32 (1978).
7. See infra notes 24 & 29 and accompanying text.
As a result, Edison will recover $162.5 million from its ratepayers rather than the
$278.3 million it requested. See In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Uti!. Rep. 4th (PUR)
431,473-74 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Uti!. 1982). The total will be allocated among Edison's
550,000 customers over 13 years. Boston Globe, May I, 1982, at I, co!.l.
Edison proposed either a one-time recovery or one over a shorter period of time. The
Department rejected Edison's proposal to avoid placing a severe burden on the ratepayers,
while allowing Edison to recover such a large amount through its rates. In Re Boston
Edison Co., 46 Pub. Uti!. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 472-73 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Uti!. 1982).
8. Attorney Gen. v. Department of Pub. Uti!., 390 Mass. 208, 210, 455 N.E.2d 414,
416 (1983).
9. Attorney Gen. v. Department of Pub. Uti!., 390 Mass. 222, 455 N.E.2d
414,421(1983).
Statutory authority allows the Attorney General to intervene in all Department pro
ceedings on behalf of any group of consumers. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, § lIE
(West Supp. 1984). Thus, he becomes a party in interest to an administrative decision and
may appeal if aggrieved. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 25, § 5 (West 1981).
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approve rate increases which were to recoup an investment in a plant
which would never render service. lo In Attorney General v. Depart
ment of Public Utilities, II the court affirmed the Department's asser
tion of authority to allow the rate increase. 12
Generally, Massachusetts regulatory practices prohibit the recov
ery of investments in new facilities until the public utility completes
the project,13 Attorney General, however, presented a confiicting l4 sit
uation because the Department allowed partial recovery when the Pil
grim II nuclear power plant will never be completed. At a more
practical level, the problem presented by Attorney General is the reso
lution of two seemingly opposed interests. The investors and Edison
wanted to avoid paying for the abandonment losses by reducing or
eliminating dividends. In contrast, the ratepayers objected to any in
crease in the cost of electricity which will result in no tangible benefit
in the future.
This note examines various regulatory outcomes and policies im
posed in reaction to the costs associated with nuclear power plant
abandonment including complete allowance, partial allowance under a
prudence/imprudence test, and the purported bar of any recovery.
Further, this note discusses the rationales underlying the Depart
ment's decision to allow partial recovery as well as the implications of
Attorney General in light of its probable effect on ratepayers. Finally,
this note suggests legislation aimed at preventing imprudent costs as
an amendment to existing Massachusetts statutory law concerning
electric power plant construction.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Economic and Legal Bases of Rate Regulation
The status of electric companies as public utilities l5 emanates

10. Attorney Gen. v. Department of Pub. Util., 390 Mass. 208, 222, 455 N.E.2d 414,
421 (1983).
II. 390 Mass. 208, 455 N.E.2d 414 (1983).
12. Id. at 232, 455 N.E.2d at 427.
13. Id. at 219, 455 N.E.2d at 420. The Department established this regulatory treat
ment of construction costs while in progress. The Department bases the deferral on the
policy decision that present ratepayers should not be charged for the costs of electricity to
be provided in the future. In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431,
456-57 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Util. 1982). See also New England Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Depart
ment of Pub. Util., 360 Mass. 443, 454-58, 275 N.E.2d 493,501-03 (1971). See infra note
24 for the ratemaking definition of "cost."
14. See infra note 93.
15. R. SCHMALENSEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURAL MONOPOLIES I (1979); C.
PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 10-11 (1984).
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from economic and legal theories that conclude that the production
and distribution of electricity should be subject to regulation. 16 Eco
nomic theory characterizes electricity producing enterprises as natural
monopolies under the reasoning that the more electricity a single com
pany produces, the lower the cost of each additional unit of electricity
from the company.17 Thus, the objective of efficiency is served if one
company maintains a monopoly over the supply of electricity in a
given area. IS A corollary in economic theory holds that the potential
exists for monopolies to charge whatever price they choose without
losing consumer demand. Absent regulation, the electric company
could abuse its position by demanding unreasonably high prices. 19
In response to the need for regulation, the law compels public
utilities to accept only reasonable compensation for the service they
provide and places on them an obligation to provide an adequate sup
ply of electricity.20 The latter responsibility entails a duty to build new
facilities to meet increased demands or other business oriented con tin
gencies. 21 By regulating the rates charged by a public utility, the legal
system seeks to enable the company to implement its two legal
obligations. 22
In Massachusetts, the Department of Public Utilities performs
the regulatory function. 23 The Department and all similar regulatory
agencies employ the guiding principle that the allowed rate be just and
reasonable. 24 As interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, the
16. M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, PUBLIC UTILITIES: REGULATION, MANAGEMENT,
AND OWNERSHIP 18-22 (1973).
17. Id. The necessity of a close geographical connection between the producing
plant and the land of the consumer further distinguishes public utilities from totally private
natural monopolies. The most efficient service can only be achieved, therefore, by allowing
one company to provide all the electricity in an area. J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUB
LIC UTILITY RATES 7-17 (1961).
18. R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 15, at 3-4, 13.
19. See C. PHILLIPS, supra note 15, at 63-65. Although most theorists concede that
other sources of energy such as gas or wood subject electricity to some competition,
"neither the oil lamp nor the Welsbach gas mantle can seriously rival electric lighting." 1
A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 2 (1969).
20. Protection of the company's status as a monopoly within a specific geographical
area justifies the obligations. Thus, rate regulation substitutes for competition in the mar
ketplace. See M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, supra note 16, at 28-29.
21. Id. at 21. See infra notes 71 & 109.
22. M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, supra note 16, at 21.
23. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, §§ 76, 94 (West 1976 & West Supp. 1984).
The Department's regulatory authority extends only to electric companies providing retail,
intrastate service. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, §§ 1, 76 (West Supp. 1984).
24. R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 15, at 27. See, e.g., City of Boston v. Edison Elec.
IlIum. Co. of Boston, 242 Mass. 305, 307, 136 N.E. 113, 115 (1922).
A single static method cannot delineate a definition of the concept of reasonable rates.
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process of determining just and reasonable rates involves the balancing
of both consumer and investor interests. 25 In pursuit of this somewhat
vague objective, the law of regulatory rate approval has followed a
traditional technique of analysis.
B.

Orthodox Rate Regulation Analysis

Any regulatory rate decision ultimately seeks to set a level of rev
enues for a particular company that reflects production expenses plus
a reasonable profit. 26 Future rates are usually made solely with refer
ence to the company's past activities and surrounding economic cir
cumstances. Thus, the department adopts a test year27 as the
parameter within which to set the value of four basic components used
as tools to reach just and reasonable rates.
First, the department ascertains the gross revenue of the company
The factors considered and methods employed must change with the times. Federal Power
Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591,602 (1944). The most pervasive feature
in the reasonableness determination is the cost of producing electricity. "Cost," as used in
ratemaking, includes not only the company's out-of-pocket expenditures but also the
amount it must pay investors to provide capita!. The latter element of "cost" compels the
public official to allow the company an opportunity to earn a reasonable profit. J. BON
BRIGHT, supra note 17, at 63-71.
The inclusion of a profit component rests on the fourteenth amendment and equivalent
due process guarantees in all state constitutions that prevent confiscation of private prop
erty. Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Servo Comm'n of W. Va., 262
U.S. 679, 690 (1923). See also MASS. CONST. Pt. I, arts. I, 10 & 12. See, e.g., Fitchburg Gas
& Elec. Light Co. v. Department of Pub. Uti!., 371 Mass. 881, 884, 359 N.E.2d 1294, 1297
(1977). See generally Dakin, The Changing Nature of Utility Rate Regulation: Just Com
pensation, Due Process and Equal Protection, 36 TuL. L. REV. 401 (1962). In order to
support a charge of confiscation a company must show that the department's decision de
prives it of an opportunity to recover the costs of providing electricity and a reasonable
profit. Massachusetts Elec. CO. V. Department of Pub. Uti!., 376 Mass. 294, 298-99, 381
N.E.2d 325, 328-29 (1978). Under the constitutional mandate, the company may challenge
the Department's definition and valuation of the concepts used in a particular rate proceed
ing. The overall qualifier of "just and reasonable," therefore, provides department control
over monopoly pricing yet enables the company to provide adequate service.
25. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591,603 (1944). In
the broad area of rate determination, the investors are interested in deriving income from
the rates and having the company maintained as a stable business. The consumers desire
the minimization of rates and an adequate supply of electricity. The latter consumer inter
est mayor may not dovetail with the investors' interest in the company's financial integrity.
See J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 17, at 38.
26. See supra note 24.
27. The Department usually chooses the most recent twelve month period preceed
ing its rate investigation as the test year. The department bases all its decisions concerning
future rates on the company's activities during this period. R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note
IS, at 27.
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during the test year. 28 The department eventually compares the gross
revenue to the other three components to determine whether it is equal
to the rate level which should have been earned as costs of service and
profit. The second component, operating expenses, generally accounts
for the company's out-of-pocket expenditures which represent the cost
of providing service. 29 The interaction of the third and fourth compo
nents of ratemaking analysis, rate base and rate of return, establish a
reasonable margin of profit. 30 The rate base comprises the amount of
capital invested in facilities that were used and useful in providing
electricity during the test year. When multiplied by the rate of return,
it yields the amount of allowable profit. 3I
Since the rate base has a fixed definition changing only with in
vestment activities producing tangible electricity service, the depart
ment varies the rate of return to reflect the economic situation during
the test period. Two factors designed to allow an economically rea
sonable profit margin, therefore, determine the rate of return. 32 First,
under the objective of just compensation for assets dedicated to the
public,33 the department considers the amount of profit which other
businesses of comparable risk earn. 34 Second, the department ascer
tains the rate of return which the company must pay its investors to
28. More specifically, gross revenue is the total amount received directly from the
consumers during a twelve month period. I A. PRIEST, supra note 19, at 45.
29. I A. PRIEST, supra note 19, at so. The major portion of operating expenses are
directly connected with the production of electricity distributed during the test period.
This concept, however, also includes amortization of the investment in property previously
acquired and currently providing service. In Massachusetts, the Department has allowed
charitable contributions and advertising expenditures as operating expenses as long as they
are reasonable and benefit the company's business. American Hoech~st Corp. v. Depart
ment of Pub. Util., 379 Mass. 408, 413, 399 N.E.2d 1,4-5 (1980); New England Tel. and
Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., 360 Mass. 443, 482-90, 275 N.E.2d 493, 517-21
(1971)(advertising and charitable expenditures are legitimate expenses of a business). The
General Court has recently limited a company's recovery of advertising expenditures,
seemingly overuling New England Tel. and Tel. Co., based on the content and goals of its
advertising. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 33A (West Supp. 1984) (enacted in 1981).
30. R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note IS, at 27.
31. I A. PRIEST, supra note 19, at 139-42.
A trend among commentators on ratemaking exists favoring replacement of the bifur
cated system of reference to a rate base and a rate of return with one relying exclusively
upon the reasonableness requirement established in constitutional guidelines and economic
principles. Thus, the amount of profit should be sufficient "to maintain confidence in the
financial integrity of the enterprise; to maintain the credit of the enterprise; and to attract
capital to the enterprise." Foster, Fair Return Criteria and Estimation, 28 BAYLOR L.
REV. 883, 885 (1976).
32. M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, supra note 16, at 118-19.
33. See supra note 24.
34. Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Servo Comm'n of W. Va.,
262 U.S. 679, 692-93 (1923). See also Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,
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maintain a continuing source of capital to accomplish its obligation of
adequate service. 3s
After gross revenues, operating expenses, the rate base, and the
rate of return have been established, the department adds the operat
ing expenses to the allowed return, computed by multiplying the rate
base by the rate of return, to determine the company's revenue re
quirement for the test year. If the revenue requirement exceeds the
gross revenues collected during the test year, then the department in
creases the total amount recoverable from consumers by an amount
equa. to the deficiency.36
C.

Rate Regulation After the Abandonment of a Nuclear Power
Plant Prior to Completion
1.

Application of Regulatory Concepts to Account for
Recovery of Abandonment Losses

Regulatory agencies in several states have allowed public utilities
to recover the costs of abandoned projects. 37 These regulatory agen
cies followed the basic ratemaking methodology, but they diverged
into two methods of accounting for the costs: -increasing the rate of
return or allowing an addition to operating expenses.
In Washington Utilities & Transportation Commission v. Pacific
Power & Light Co., 38 the electric company sought to recover the share
of its investment in two jointly owned, prudently abandoned 39 nuclear
power plant projects allocated to its service area in Washington. In
response to the company's request, the Washington Utilities & Trans
portation Commission (Commission) increased the rate of return. 40
Thus, the Commission allowed the company to recover its expendi
tures by increased rates through an increase in the allowed return. 41
The Commission reasoned that the rate of return could act as an ap
propriate category in which to reflect the abandonment losses because
investors would perceive that the company had become a higher risk
investment. As a result, the company would have to pay larger divi
320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944); Massachusetts Elec. Co. v. Department of Pub. Uti!., 376 Mass.
294, 300, 381 N.E.2d 325, 329 (1978).
35. See Massachusetts Elec. Co. v. Department of Pub. Uti!., 376 Mass. 294, 299
300,381 N.E.2d 325, 329-30 (1978). See generally I A. PRIEST, supra note 19, at 191-94.
36. P. GARFIELD & W. LOVEJOY, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 44-45 (1964).
37. 390 Mass. at 224 n.lO, 455 N.E.2d at 422-23 n.lO.
38. 51 Pub. Uti!. Rep. 4th (PUR) 158 (Wash. Uti!. & Transp. Comm'n 1983).
39. See infra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
40. 51 Pub. Uti!. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 168.
41. See supra note 29 & 34 and accompanying text.
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dends to attract capital in order to be able to perform its service obli
gation. Since the rate of return is partially based on the company's
cost of capital, losses which might cause a rise in this cost justified
recovery by a higher rate of return.42
Another method would allow the recovery of abandonment costs
as operating expenses. 43 The second treatment parallels the com
pany's recovery of capital invested in new facilities through the
mechanics of a depreciation expense while the facility generates elec
tricity.44 If the planned facility were completed and were to begin ser
vice, however, the company would be able to reflect its value in an
increased rate base, thereby gaining an opportunity to earn a greater
amount of profit. 45 Thus, the "operating expense" method restores
the amount invested and lost without allowing the company to profit
on an investment that will never benefit the consumers. 46 A majority
of agencies allowing recovery for abandonment losses have used the
"operating expense" method. 47
2.

Policy Rationales to Allow Recovery of Abandonment
Costs

Generally, decisions to allow recovery of abandonment costs stem
from the view that the regulatory agency must balance the investor
and the consumer interests in order to arrive at just and reasonable
42. 51 Pub. Uti I. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 168.
43. In Re Atlantic City Elec. Co., 51 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 109, 115 (N.J. Bd. of
Pub. Util. 1983).
44. 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 19, at 112-13.
45. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
46. See In Re Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 503, 557 (Me.
Pub. Util. Comm'n 1982).
47. In Re Atlantic City Elec. Co., 51 Pub. Uti I. Rep. 4th (PUR) 109, 115 (N.J. Bd. of
Pub. Uti I. 1983). Most, if not all, of the agencies which have allowed the company to
recover abandonment losses from the ratepayers through the operating expense account
have characterized the losses as flowing from an extraordinary property loss incurred in an
effort to fulfill the "adequate service" obligation. See, e.g., In Re Rochester Gas & Elec.
Corp., 45 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 386 (N.Y. Pub. Servo Comm'n 1982); In Re Virginia
Elec. & Power Co., 29 PUb. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 65, 76 (Va. St. Corp. Comm'n 1979).
They derive their characterization of the losses from the accounting regulations placed on
interstate electric companies under the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Com
mission (FERC). Cf Note, Allocation of the Risk of Constructing Electric Power Plants,
1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 517, 520-21. The regulations provide for an account that "shall in
clude extraordinary losses on property abandoned or otherwise retired from service which
are not provided for by the accumulated provisions for depreciation or amortization and
which could not have been foreseen and provided for, and extraordinary losses.. . . which
could not reasonably have been anticipated . . . ." 18 C.F.R. § 101 (1983) (emphasis ad
ded). The last condition embodies the prudence standard which almost all state agencies
employ in allowing recovery. See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
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rates. 48
In the question of who should pay the costs of abandonment, the
ratepayers presumably desire not to pay for a facility that will never
provide them with any service. One may further surmise that ratepay
ers are also interested in adequate and economical service. To fulfill
the latter interest, the company must plan49 to meet future electricity
demands and other contingencies. Thus, expenditures in planning to
build a facility based on projections in demand and forecasts of the
availability of the company's raw materials correspond to the ratepay
ers' interest, even though the company must later abandon the project
prior to completion. The consumers' interest can be defined, there
fore, as a desire not to pay for a company's waste or inefficiency. The
investors' interest, on the other hand, lies in receiving the highest re
turn possible on their capital investment and in maintaining the finan
cial integrity of the company. Presumably, the ratepayers share in the
latter of the investors' two interests. 50
Considering the interests of the investors as well as those of the
ratepayers, regulatory agencies have passed all or some of the losses on
48. See, e.g., In Re Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co., 46 Pub. Uti I. Rep. 4th 503, 556-57 (Me.
Pub. Util. Comm'n 1982); In Re Atlantic City Elec. Co., 51 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)
109, 115 (N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util. 1983); In Re Carolina Power and Light Co., 49 Pub. Uti I.
Rep. 4th (PUR) 188, 216-17 (N.C. Util. Comm'n 1982); In Re Central Vt. Public Servo
Corp., 49 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 372,391-93 (Vt. Pub. Servo Bd. 1982); In Re Washing
ton Util. & Transp. Comm'n V. Pacific Power & Light, 51 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 158,
168 (Wash. Util. & Transp. Comm'n 1983).
The United States Supreme Court originated the balancing viewpoint in a rate case not
involving abandonment costs. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S.
591 (1944). The Court reviewed the Federal Power Commission's decision to reduce the
rate level recoverable by the company from its customers. Id. at 593. The Court held that
"it is the result reached not the methods employed which is controlling" on the issue of
whether rates are just and reasonable. Id. at 602. In sustaining the Commission's deci
sions, moreover, the Court concluded that the ratemaking process as a whole "involves a
balancing of the investor and the consumer interests." Id. at 603. The Commission satis
fied the Court's balancing process when it arrived at a rate level sufficient to give the com
pany enough revenue for the capital costs of the business as well as for operating expenses.
Id. Consistent with its adoption of a fact-based balancing test, the Court affirmed the
agency's decision without judging the propriety of the particular methods the commission
employed in determining the value of the company's rate base and rate of return. Id. at
605-06.
49. As of November 2, 1982, a majority of voters state wide must approve each pro
posed nuclear power plant project as part of a company's plan to build. MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 164 app., § 3-3 (West Supp. 1984). See infra notes 123-126 and accompanying
text for another restraint on a company's plan.
50. See In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Uti I. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 453-55 (Mass.
Dep't of Pub. Util. 1982); Stewart, A Bankrupt Utility - What If?, 112 PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
Sept. 15, 1983, at IS, 17. See also supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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to the ratepayers. The agencies rest their "sharing of loss" approach 51
on a recognition of the company's legal obligation to add capacity to
provide adequate service or produce electricity in the most efficient
manner. 52 Permitting recovery, agencies have used two main theories.
The first holds that the investors have not previously been compen
sated for the risk inherent in the construction of a nuclear plant. The
second measures the extent to which the company's management
could not reasonably foresee the loss. Although other policies may be
elucidated to support a recovery of prudent investments in new facili
ties that are never completed,53 the above two theories are the most
common. 54
The risk compensation theory requires an investigation of
whether the investors previously received compensation for the risk of
non-completion. Thus, the inquiry focuses primarily on the rate of
return allowed in the past. The risk for the company of the abandon
ment and loss of the investment would have to be ascertained accord
ing to the characteristics of the project undertaken and the prior
experience of businesses undertaking similar projects. 55 Since inves
tors require a direct relationship between the risk of loss and the
amount of dividends,56 the regulatory agency would then have to cal
culate the appropriate rate of return to compensate an investor for
bearing the ascertained risk. Finally, the appropriate rate of return
would be compared to the actual rate of return effective prior to aban
donment. If the actual rate is lower than the projected rate, then the
regulatory agency would pass the loss sustained by the cancellation on
to the ratepayers. 57
51. See, e.g., In Re Atlantic City Elec. Co., 51 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 109, 115
(N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util. 1983).
52. See generally Sommers, Recovery of Electric Utility Losses from Abandoned Con
struction Projects, 8 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 363 (1982).·
53. See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
54. Note, A New Approach to Allocating Financial Responsibility for Cancelled Nu
clear Units - Consumers' Counsel v. Public Utility Commission of Ohio, 13 U. ToL. L.
REV. 1469, 1475-81 (1982).
55. Note, Allocation of the Risk of Constructing Electric Power Plants, 1976 WASH.
U.L.Q. 517, 525.
56. K. BOUDREAUX & H. LoNG, THE BASIC THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 54
(1977).
57. See, e.g., In Re Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 503, 557
(Me. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1982); In Re Central Vt. Public Servo Corp., 49 Pub. Uti I. Rep.
4th (PUR) 372, 391-92 (Vt. Pub. Servo Bd. 1982); Washington Uti I. & Transp. Comm'n v.
Pacific Power & Light Co., 51 Pub. Uti I. Rep. 4th (PUR) 158, 168 (Wash. Util. & Transp.
Comm'n 1983). The regulatory agencies have derived the risk compensation mode of anal
ysis from their treatment of undepreciated investment in retired facilities which companies
have been allowed to recover from the ratepayers. Note, Accounting for Extraordinary
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Total reliance upon the risk compensation method, however, may
lead to an inequitable apportionment of the loss. First, it ignores the
question of whether the company's management instituted and pur
sued the project in a prudent manner.58 Since ratepayers 59 have less
control than investors over management decisions,6O the investors
should be charged with losses sustained as a result of imprudent man
agement. 61 Secondly, the two components of the theory - risk of loss
and the appropriate return which would compensate for it - would be
difficult to ascertain after the loss had occurred. 62
The other common rationale considers whether the company's
managers foresaw or should have foreseen the cancellation. 63 If the
investment loss did not become apparent until the time the company
decided to abandon it, the regulatory agencies have held that the com
pany made prudent decisions to continue. Thus, the test under the
second rationale asks whether the negative events64 surrounding the
Obsolescence, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1431 (1952). See, e.g., Washington Gas Light Co. v.
Baker, 188 F.2d II, 19-20 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 952 (1951) (policy of risk
compensation may allow inclusion of prematurely retired plant in rate base, but the rate of
return must be reduced concomitantly).
58. See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
59. The ratepayers' input into management decisions concerning construction is non
existent because they are relegated solely to control through the regulatory agency's
ratemaking authority. City of Boston v. Edison Elec. IlIum. Co. of Boston, 242 Mass. 305,
310-14, 136 N.E. 113, 116-17 (1922). Cj E. BERLIN, C. CiCHEITI & W. GILLEN, PER
SPECTIVES ON POWER 91 (1975) (even if citizens may participate in licensing proceedings
any input arrives too late because growth determination will have already been made)
[hereinafter cited as E. BERLIN].
60. M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, supra note 16, at 95.
61. See In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Uti!. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 461 (Mass.
Dep't of Pub. Uti!. 1982).
62. Note, supra note 54, at 1481. The risk of loss approach, furthermore, fails to
recognize that the company is only entitled to an overall rate level which allows an opportu
nity to recover the costs of providing electricity and a reasonable profit. See supra note 24
and accompanying text.
63. See In Re Detroit Edison Co., NUCLEAR REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 20,035, at 16,223
24 (Mich. Pub. Servo Comm'n July 26, 1976).
64. The events which have made abandonment a more frequent occurrence in recent
years include the rapidly increasing costs of building nuclear power facilities which must be
funded through capital attraction, the difficulties in engineering design due to environmen
tal and health concerns, and the unprecedented negative demand response to a rise in the
cost of oil for the production of electricity. Allison, Judging the Prudence of Constructing
Nuclear Power Plants: A Report to the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, 15 TULSA L.J.
262, 267 (1980). For example, authorities have cited two factors as the major causes of
cancellation; the moratorium on licensing of construction as a result of the Three Mile
Island accident and the upwardly spiraling cost of construction. See Sommers, Recovery of
Electric Utility Losses From Abandoned Construction Projects, 8 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
363, 364 (1982); Note, Who Shall Bear the Cost of Abandonment, 11 CAP. U.L. REV. 91,
91-92 (1981). Cj Cook, Nuclear Follies, FORBES, Feb. 11, 1985, at 82 (other major causes
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project made its initiation or continuation imprudent. The line is
drawn by looking at whether the management's decisions were reason
able at the time considering the circumstances under which they were
made. The agencies allow the company to recover all costs prudently
incurred from the ratepayers. 65
ANALYSIS

A.

Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities'Decision to Allow
Boston Edison to Recover Part of its Investment in Pilgrim II

In the regulatory rate proceeding which gave rise to Attorney
General, the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities noted that
the losses on Pilgrim II were the largest to date nationwide and that its
task was to achieve balance between consumer and investor interests. 66
Returning to the basic attributes of public utility business and regula
tory control,67 the Department identified three essential components:
the obligation of the company to provide adequate service; the neces
sity of regulatory price control; and a public obligation to support the
financial integrity of the company that provides service. 68 The De
partment determined that the components compelled sharing the
losses of Pilgrim II's cancellation. 69
In order to support further the contention that the losses had to
be shared, the Department engaged in a psuedo-risk compensation
analysis. 70 It reasoned that the cancellation of Pilgrim II constituted
an "extraordinary risk" legitimately undertaken by the company to
replace its dependence upon the unpredictable supply of oiU! The
of cancellation include disregard of cost effectiveness, poor conventional construction
methods, and inadequate management controls over construction progress).
Arguably, the companies should have foreseen these events, especially the engineering
problems during construction, and resolved them at the stage of an initial decision on the
viability of nuclear power. See infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text for a possible
explanation of the company's refusal to confront potential problems with nuclear power
plants. The recent multiplicity of nuclear power plant abandonments emphasizes the need
for a reexamination of nuclear power in terms of its financial as well as environmental
hazards.
65. Note, supra note 54, at 1481. See Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co. v. Depart
ment of Pub. Util., 371 Mass. 881, 882-84, 359 N.E.2d 1294, 1296-97 (1977).
66. In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 456 (Mass. Dep't of
Pub. Util. 1982). See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 15-35 and accompanying text.
68. In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 453-55 (Mass.
Dep't of Pub. Util. 1982).
69. Id. at 460.
70. Id. at 457-60. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
71. A Department decision, rendered before cancellation, supplied the conclusion
here that the company had legitimately undertaken the Pilgrim II project and, therefore,
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Department defined "extraordinary risk" as one usually encountered
only in enterprises that offer investors the possibility of receiving large
dividends upon their investments. In public utility law, however, reg
ulatory price control serves to limit the amount of dividends which a
public utility may distribute to its investors. 72 Thus, the Department
the unforeseen risk component embodied in it. In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Uti!.
Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 437 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Util. 1982). In 1979, Edison's request for
rate increases totaling $200 million spurred the Department to investigate the Pilgrim II
construction project. See Boston Edison Co., D.P.U. Order No. 19494, at 5 (Mass. Dep't
of Pub. Util. Sept. 22, 1981). The investigation included an examination of "future demand
for electricity in the company's service territory, the appropriate level of reserve [electric
production] capacity, and alternatives to the [Pilgrim II] construction program." In Re
Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Uti!. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 433 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Util.
1982). Despite the seemingly large scope of the 1979 investigation, the Department de
clined to consider Edison's ability to finance the project to completion. Id. at 436. On
September 22, 1981, one day before the company cancelled Pilgrim II, the Department
issued its decision regarding justification of the project:
The results clearly show the economic benefits of Pilgrim II. Just one year
after the unit is placed in service its annual fuel savings exceed its total costs. By
1994, Pilgrim II would save ratepayers nearly $660 million in power costs, and
that amount will continue to increase into the future.
We must emphasize that we do not rely solely on mechanical computations
to reach this result. Indeed, we acknowledge that the many calculations included
in this Order create a deceiving appearance of precision in an area fraught with
uncertainty.
Rather, this decision represents a careful review of the record and a reasoned
judgment about the prudence of the Company's current construction program.
Despite the significant risks inherent in that undertaking, the consequences of
continuing our present dependence on imported oil are far less acceptable. In the
midst of all the uncertainty surrounding the issues in this case, the one develop
ment which we consider to be most likely is that the price of oil will continue to
escalate at a rapid pace. We find it extremely difficult to overstate the problems
associated with the Company's principal dependence upon a commodity which in
eight years has increased in price in excess of 700 percent. Moreover, there is
also considerable reason to doubt the reliability of oil supplies in the coming
decade. The very real possibility of interruption of foreign-dominated supplies
should be enough to mandate a policy of displacing oil-fired generation. Depen
dence which is so vulnerable to disruption places all domestic users in a precari
ous posture which is definitely contrary to state and national interests.
Accordingly, it is an inescapable conclusion from this proceeding that oil, the
Company's largest existing source of electric generation, is no longer an accepta
ble option. We have also determined that nuclear power, despite its recent
problems, is most likely to be the least expensive generation alternative available
to the Company.
It is these two conclusions that compel a finding that the Company's genera
tion construction program is reasonable.
Boston Edison Co., D.P.U. Order No. 19494, at 190-91 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Util. Sept. 22,
1981) (footnotes omitted). The record of the investigation closed in February 1980. 390
Mass. at 230, 455 N.E.2d at 426.
72. See supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
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concluded that Edison's investors had not been compensated for the
risk of non-completion of Pilgrim 11.73
The Department's analysis reflects a conclusory treatment of the
risk compensation theory based on general notions of public utility
economics and on the finding that the company's ability to provide
adequate service in the future would be impaired if the ratepayers did
not share the losses. 74
Instead of relying completely upon its risk compensation analysis,
the Department proceeded to apply a prudence standard 75 to Edison's
actions throughout the project's life. It placed the burden on Edison
to show that the need for the nuclear facility 76 and the ability to fi
nance it sufficiently justified the decision to continue at various
times. 77 Thus, the Department drew the line on sharing the losses by
excluding those incurred after the level of risk had become unaccept
ably high and after the company's managers should have recognized
it. 78 Under its second analysis, the Department used the rationale of
73. In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 458-60 (Mass.
Dep't of Pub. Util. 1982). Cf Robinson, Utility Fiascoes - Who Should Pay?, PUB. UTIL.
FORT., Dec. 17, 1981, at 17, 18 (1981) (arguing that investors buy public utility stocks for
the prospect of a return on their investment and not for a specific amount of the return if
the prospect is realized and that the risk consists of abandonment accompanied by regula
tory disallowance of recovery).
The need to compensate investors for their initial contributions of capital rested on the
theory that otherwise the company would fail. See Stewart, supra note 50, at 15-17. Since
public utilities compete for operating cash, which they later recover from the ratepayers, an
inability to pay the amounts demanded for the use of money would destroy the company's
ability to perform its service obligation. In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 431, 458-60 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Util. 1982).
74. See In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431,458-60 (Mass.
Dept of Pub. Util, 1982). One commissioner dissented. In his view, the investors could
shoulder the whole Pilgrim II loss by using the company's retained earnings over several
years. He characterized the basic finding of an inability to provide service without present
recoupment of losses as a "smoke screen" produced by the company's "scare tactics." In
Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 485-86 (Mass. Dep't of Pub.
Util. 1982) (Commissioner Sprague, dissenting).
75. The standard of scrutiny to which the Department held the company's managers
was whether their decisions were reasonable "in light of all conditions and circumstances
which were known at the time the decisions were made." In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 438 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Util. 1982).
76. See supra note 71.
77. In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 436-38 (Mass.
Dep't of Pub. Util. 1982).
78. Id. at 470-12. The date on which Edison should have abandoned Pilgrim II was
set at JUne, 1980. Id. at 470. The Department allowed recovery for all costs incurred prior
to that date. In the Department's view, the recovery had to include a carrying charge,
which essentially provides a percentage return on the balance of the loss to be recovered in
future years. The justification held that all money prudently spent should have been reim
bursed on the date of cancellation. Since immediate reimbursement would place an inordi
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foreseeability of the loss to determine the amount each group would
pay.
A third policy basis for allowing the losses from the cancellation
of a prudently maintained nuclear plant project appears in the Depart
ment's reasoning. If the Department does not allow an electric utility
to recoup its losses, then potential investors would demand higher div
idends than the company, under regulatory restraint, would be able to
pay. Even though the company might not reach bankruptcy, the nec
essary capital to implement new technologies in the production of
electricity would be unavailable. 79 Consumers would also suffer be
cause they would be at the mercy of future events affecting the re
source presently used to produce electricity. so
B.

Attorney General v. Department of Public Utilities
In Attorney General v. Department ofPublic Utilities, the supreme

judicial court ratified the reasoning of the Department and its alloca
tion of the losses between the ratepayers and the investors. s1 The anal
ysis supporting the conclusion revolved primarily around the policy
making authority which the legislature left to the Department by stat
ute and the court's exercise ofjudicial restraint in light of the statutory
nate burden on the ratepayers, repayment was scheduled into the future. In order to
compensate for the time value of money, the Department applied a carrying charge. Id. at
473. Compare Pacific Power & Light Co., UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 23,974 (Mont. Pub. Servo
Comm'n Apr. 19, 1983) (stating that application of a carrying charge to any allowed costs
would result in a more beneficial treatment of the costs than if the utility completed the
project). Other state regulatory agencies have also split the losses on a prudence/impru
dence standard but denied the investors any compensation for recovery of the investment
over a period of time. See, e.g., In Re Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co., 46 Pub. Uti!. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 503, 557 (Me. Pub. Uti!. Comm'n 1982); In Re Central Vt. Public Servo Corp., 49
Pub. Uti!. Rep. 4th (PUR) 372, 391-92 (Vt. Pub. Servo Bd. 1982); In Re Northern States
Power Co., 46 Pub. Uti!. Rep. 4th (PUR) 110, 116 (Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n 1981). In
Massachusetts, the Department compromised by allowing carrying charge treatment of
only the non-equity portion of the capital prudently invested in Pilgrim II. In excluding
the equity portion, the Department noted that the equity investors possessed voting rights
to control management efficiency and that they could not expect a guaranteed profit on
their investment. In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Uti!. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 471-73
(Mass. Dep't of Pub. Uti!. 1982).
79. In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 PUb. Uti!. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431,475 (Mass. Dep't of
Pub. Uti!. 1982).
80. The Pilgrim II project represents the point nicely. Edison attempted to reduce
dependence upon scarce and unreliable foreign oil by initiating the project. Id. at 448.
Assuming that nuclear power was the best alternative to oil, Edison had as its overall
objective to fulfill its obligation to respond to events making it uneconomical to rely on the
supply of this raw material to maintain an adequate level of electricity. Id. at 459.
81. 390 Mass. at 232,455 N.E.2d at 427.
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scheme. 82
1.

The Role of the Judiciary in Reviewing the Department's
Prudency Determination

The Attorney General waged an alternative attack on the propri
ety of the recovery allowed by the Department. The appellant as
sumed that the Department possessed the authority to consider
allowance but argued that its determination of prudence was arbitrary
and capricious. 83
Under the Massachusetts State Administrative Procedure Act,
the judiciary plays a restricted role in the review of administrative de
cisions. 84 In public utility regulation, the supreme judicial court has
reviewed the Department's factual findings only upon the company's
showing that the Department reached a confiscatory decision. 85 Fur
thermore, the arbitrary and capricious standard involves a test as to
whether substantial evidence exists on the record to support the De
partment's conclusions. 86 Since the Department examined and
presented its reasoning in sustaining Edison's decisions at various
points during the project's life, the supreme judicial court correctly
concluded that it could not review the particularities of the Depart
ment's judgment. The court thereby dismissed the challenge to the
Department's determination of when the continuation became impru
dent, in terms of financeability, to continue the Pilgrim II project. 87 In
view of the statutory constraints on judicial review of the Department,
the court's deference in this area could have been predicted. Thus, the
only remaining question was whether the Department committed an
error of law when it allowed any recovery on the Pilgrim II
82. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 94 (West 1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 30A, § 14 (West 1979). When examined in light of each other, the two statutes
support the court's premises that (I) the Department possesses the authority to use policy
to define "operating costs" and (2) the court is limited in its review of the Department's
determination and must give deference to agency policy-making. Contra 390 Mass. at 241
43, 455 N.E.2d at 432 (Liacos, J., dissenting).
83. Brief for Appellant at 34-62, Attorney Gen. v. Department of Pub. Util., 390
Mass. 208,455 N.E.2d 414 (1983).
84. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 14 (West 1979).
85. See Massachusetts Elee. Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., 376 Mass. 294, 298-99
& 298 n.2, 381 N.E.2d 325, 328-29 & 328 n.2 (1978). A charge of confiscation allows the
court to review the factual findings in detail because the charge has Constitutional signifi
cance. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
86. Boston Edison Co. v. Assessors of Watertown, 387 Mass. 298, 302-04, 439
N.E.2d 763, 766 (1982).
87. 390 Mass. at 228, 455 N.E.2d at 425.
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investment. 88
2.

The Importance of the Statutory Scheme

Regulatory agencies are creatures of state legislative action. Stat
utes create them and enumerate their powers.89 Authorizing statutes
that have very broad language, however, delegate policy-making au
thority to the regulatory agencies. 90 In Massachusetts, the legislature
has given the Department broad authority to approve or modify pro
posed increases in rates in accordance with its determination of the
"public interest." The only affirmative requirements placed on the
Department are procedural. When a company proposes any increase,
the Department must hold a public hearing and notify the Attorney
General. 91 Conspicuously, the statute does not mention the ratemak
ing concepts nor parameters by which the Department might be lim
ited in considering the inclusion of any company expense.92 The
88. See infra note 92.
89. M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, supra note 16, at 64.
90. See R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 15, at 22-24.
91. See supra note 3.
92. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 94 (West 1976). The Department under
its statutory authority has adopted the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Uniform
System of Accounts for electric utilities with certain modifications. MASS. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 220, § 51.01 (1981). See supra note 47. The regulations impose a system of accounting
on the companies within the Department's jurisdiction but remain silent on the issue of
their use in the Department's ratemaking analysis. See MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 220,
§ 51.00 (1981).
The possibility of the Department committing an error of law by allowing recovery is
restricted to a consideration of the scope of the Department's statutory authority to make
policy, its possible Constitutional violations, or its action in spite of a lack of substantial
evidence. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934). Otherwise, "the courts
would usurp . . . all discretionary action in the government and in effect would be di
recting and supervising all branches." Public Servo Comm'n of Ind. V. City of Indianapolis,
235 Ind. 70, 81, 131 N.E.2d 308, 312 (1956). The dissent in Attorney General attempted to
find an error oflaw not based on the Department's policy judgments. Thus, Justice Liacos
charges the Department with retroactive ratemaking. See 390 Mass. at 240-41, 455 N.E.2d
at 431. The principle of non-retroactivity, however, does not apply to the regulatory
agency's consideration of lawful rate revision. Cf City of Knoxville V. Knoxville Water
Co., 212 U.S. I, 13-14 (1909) (affirming the regulatory agency's holding that a company
cannot include depreciated plant values in the rate base so as to reflect an increase in the
return because it was entitled to and failed to request sufficient rates for its output or capital
costs in the past). Non-retroactivity serves to protect the presumptive legality of the rate
level set by a regulatory agency and to assign to the utility the risk of loss stemming from
the stay of a rate adjustment order. Boston Edison CO. V. Department of Pub. Util., 375
Mass. 1,6, 375 N.E.2d 305, 312 (1978) (citing New England Tel. and Tel. CO. V. Public
Uti I. Comm'n, 116 R.I. 356,387-94,358 A.2d I, 19-23 (1976», cerr. denied, 439 U.S. 921
(1978). Thus, the principle seems limited to circumstances in which (I) a public utility
seeks to obtain a larger increase in rates from the court than it would have if the regulatory
agency had granted its request for rate revision; or (2) the regulatory agency seeks to revise
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statutory scheme permitted the court to conclude that the legislature
had delegated to the Department the policy decision of whether to
include abandonment losses as a cost of public utility operations. 93
The statutory underpinnings 94 of the outcome in Attorney Gen
eral are even more apparent when compared to another judicial deci
sion95 on the allowance of nuclear plant abandonment losses. In Office
retroactively a previously ordered rate. See, e.g., Boston Edison Co. v. Department of Pub.
Util., 375 Mass. 1,4-6,375 N.E.2d 305,311-12 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 921 (1978);
City of Newton v. Department of Pub. Util., 367 Mass. 667, 679-80, 328 N.E.2d 885, 892
93 (1975). Furthermore, if non-retroactivity were not restricted to its purposes, then the
rule would destroy the test year method of determining just and reasonable rates. The test
year method considers adequacy of past revenues when determining future rates. See supra
note 27 and accompanying text.
93. 390 Mass. at 227-28, 455 N.E.2d at 424-25.
Despite the supreme judicial court's assertion that it has always deferred to the De
partment in areas of policymaking, the court in New England Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Depart
ment of Pub. Uti!. overruled the Department's disallowance of some charitable
contributions which was based on the policy that they did not benefit the ratepayers. See
New England Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., 360 Mass. 443, 485, 275
N.E.2d 493,518 (1971). See also supra note 29 (recent Massachusetts legislation appar
ently overruling the court's decision in New England Tel. and Tel. Co. on the legitimacy of
recovery of certain advertising expenditures). But see West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Uti I.
Comm'n of Ohio, 294 U.S. 63, 70 (1935).
The last bastion of potential judicial interference in favor of ratepayers seems to be the
court's requirement that the Department apply its policies and practices in a consistent
manner. 390 Mass. at 222, 455 N.E.2d at 422. Compare Boston Edison Co. v. Department
of Pub. Util., 375 Mass. I, 20-21, 375 N.E.2d 305, 319 (1978) (using the consistency rule to
favor the company), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 921 (1978). Attorney General itself, however,
illustrates an inconsistency between the Department's practice of denying recovery of capi
tal expenditures until a project is completed, 390 Mass. at 219, 455 N.E.2d at 420; see New
England Tel. and Tel. Co. V. Department of Pub. Util., 360 Mass. 443, 454-56, 275 N.E.2d
493, 501 (1971), and its practice of allowing recovery of prudent capital expenditures in an
abandoned project. 390 Mass. at 217,455 N.E.2d at 419. The judicially sanctioned incon
sistency shows that the Department may not always mean what it says in public utility
ratemaking. Instead of the fiat regulatory policy of non-recovery until completion, the
court has clarified the Department's practice as no recovery until completion unless the
project will never be completed.
The two situations may be distinguished on three grounds. First, if the project is
abandoned, then the company must risk a regulatory determination that the company was
imprudent in some or all of its expenditures. See In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util.
Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 435, 437-38 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Util. 1982). Second, the equitable
theory that present ratepayers should not be compelled to pay the costs of future service
disappears when any possibility of completion evaporates. See supra note 13. Third, if the
expenditures were recovered at the time they were made then methods of depreciation and
the determination of the return allowed with reference to the rate base (plant used and
useful minus depreciation allowed) would have to be dismantled.
94. See Pacific Power & Light Co., UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 23,974 (Mont. Pub. Servo
Comm'n Apr. 19, 1983).
95. Recently, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire responded to the state regula
tory agency's question on its authority to allow recovery of Public Service Company of
New Hampshire's Pilgrim II losses. Appeal of Public Servo Co. of N.H., - N.H. - , 480
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of Consumer's Counsel v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio,96 the
Ohio Supreme Court reversed the public utility commission's decision
to allow amortization of abandonment losses incurred by the Cleve
land Electric Illuminating Company.97 The facts are almost identical
to Attorney General. 98 The Public Utilities Commission determined
that the decisions to undertake the project as well as to cancel it were
prudent. 99 In Ohio, however, the statute incorporates the orthodox
ratemaking formula loo and concepts. IOl More specifically, the statute
defines "operating costs" as the "cost to the utility of rendering the
public utility service for the test period . . . . "\02 Since the object of
the investment sought to be recovered, the four abandoned nuclear
projects, would never render service, the Ohio Supreme Court con
cluded that the statute precluded a policy-based \03 decision that any
abandonment costs fit within the category of operating costS.I04 Thus,
the statutory bar against allocating abandonment costs precluded the
commission from considering both the balance between the consumer
A.2d 20 (1984). The court noted that the language of the New Hampshire authorizing
statute denied the agency the discretion to allow recovery. Id. at -, 480 A.2d at 25.
In Wisconsin Pub. Servo Corp. v. Public Servo Comm 'n of Wis., the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin reversed and remanded the Commission's disallowance of abandonment losses
because the policy reasons underlying the regulatory decision did not have a rational basis.
The court, however, refused to consider "whether prudent [nuclear power plant project]
expenditures are always recoverable from ratepayers." Wisconsin Pub. Servo Corp. v. Pub
lic Servo Comm'n of Wis., 109 Wis. 2d 256, -, 325 N.W.2d 867, 871 (1982). Compare
NEPCO Mun. Rate Comm. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 668 F.2d 1327, 1342
44 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (affirming the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's decision to
exclude abandonment costs from rate base; recovery of investment through amortization
unchallenged).
96. 67 Ohio St. 2d 153,423 N.E.2d 820 (1981), appeal dismissed sub nom Cleveland
Elec. Illum. Co. v. Office of Consumers' Counsel, 455 U.S. 914 (1982).
97. Id. at 168, 423 N.E.2d at 829.
98. Id. at 154,423 N.E.2d at 821-22. In 1973, Cleveland Electric Illuminating Com
pany (CEI) joined four other companies to construct four nuclear power plants because of a
forecasted rise in future demand for electricity. The anticipated demand never developed.
In January, 1980, the companies cancelled all four units. CEI asserted as causes licensing
delays and the more stringent planning requirements following the Three Mile Island acci
dent making the cost of completion too high. Id. at 53-54, 423 N.E.2d at 821.
99. Id. at 162, 423 N.E.2d at 826. The Commission noted that the best data avail
able justified the decision to construct the four units. It also concluded that the decision to
terminate was reasonable because of the "intervening decline in the growth [of demand for
electricity] and the uncertainties which now attend the construction of nuclear units." Id.
lDO. See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
101. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4909.151, 4909.15 (Page 1977 & Page Supp. 1983).
102. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4909.15 (Page Supp. 1983).
103. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
104. 67 Ohio St. 2d at 166-67, 423 N.E.2d at 828-29.
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and the investor interests lOS and the effect of non-recovery on the com
pany's ability to provide service. 106
A comparison of the Ohio decision with Attorney General shows
that the extent of the regulatory agency's policy-making authority de
termines whether ratepayers maylO7 be directly charged with abandon
ment losses.
The loose statutory scheme in Massachusetts is
preferable because it is more consistent with the legal obligation placed
on the company to provide adequate service at reasonable rates.108 By
allowing the department to draw the line of recovery at the company's
imprudent actions, the regulatory agency can support the utility in its
prudent endeavors to provide adequate and more efficient service. In
contrast, the Ohio model may preclude the electric company from re
sponding to the realities of the public utility business. 109
C.

Implications

The broad statutory authority given to the Department 110 and
defensible public policy rationales III justify the decisions of the De
partment and the supreme judicial court. In present times, a statutory
scheme that authorizes the Department to balance consumer and in
vestor interests in each case serves better than a rigid statutory man
date by defining ratemaking. 112 Problems exist, however, under the
Massachusetts statutory scheme. Attorney General may result in a re
flection of imprudent costs of abandonment in the rates even though
105. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. See also infra note 109 and ac
companying text.
106. In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Locher noted that the losses sustained
by the company were not significant and could not reasonably be expected to impair the
company's ability to render service. 67 Ohio St. 2d at 171,423 N.E.2d at 831 (Locher, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). Compare Attorney Gen. v. Department of Pub.
Util., 390 Mass. at 243-44, 455 N.E.2d at 433 (Liacos, J., dissenting).
107. Of course, even if the regulatory agency operates under a loose statutory
scheme, it may deny all the abandonment costs. Its decision may be based either on a
determination that the company imprudently initiated the project, see Attorney General,
390 Mass. at 229 n. 16,455 N.E.2d at 425 n.16., or on a policy decision that it is unfair to
charge ratepayers for investments which unforeseeably go awry before completion. See In
Re Pacific Power & Light Co., UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 23,974 (Mont. Pub. Servo Comm'n
Apr. 19, 1983).
108. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
109. The law places an obligation on the public utility to provide adequate service
regardless of events such as the 1973 oil embargo and its aftermath. If the company cannot
respond to events by building facilities that employ new sources of energy, then the service
obligation will not be met. See Stewart, supra note 50, at 15-17.
110. See supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
Ill. See supra notes 66-80 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note III and accompanying text.
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the agency officially placed them on the company.l13 According to the
rate of return analysis, the cost of attracting investment monies consti
tutes a major consideration in determining the appropriate rate of re
turn. 114 In Attorney General, the investors were not fully compensated
for the risk of cancellation because they had to bear the costs of the
company's imprudent decision to continue the Pilgrim II project past
July 1980. 115 Thus, future investors will demand a higher return on
their investment because they now know they will be held responsible
for management's imprudent decisions. In turn, the company will pro
pose an increase in its rate of return claiming higher capital costs. Un
less the Department recognizes the source of the claim, it may
unwittingly allow the increase. 116 A portion of the imprudently in
curred costs may then flow through to ratepayers.
Recently, disallowed costs of an abandoned nuclear unit have, in
the manner described above, indirectly fallen upon consumers in Ohio.
On April 13, 1983, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the Ohio Public
Utility Commision's (PUC) decision to increase Cleveland Electric Il
luminating Company's (CEI) rate of return from 17.02 to 17.30 per
cent. 117 The PUC based its approval in part on an increase in CEl's
increased cost of capital. I IS The PUC noted that CEl's cost of capital
had risen during the test year because of an "increase in investors'
113. See Allison, supra note 64, at 286.
114. 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 19, at 199-202. See supra note 35 and accompanying
text.

115. See In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 455-59, 472
(Mass. Dep't of Pub. Util. 1982).
116. See Allison, supra note 64, at 298. Although the increased financing costs are
less than the amount invested and lost, the regulatory agency's allowance of an increase in
the rate of return under this scenario permits a permanent increase in the company's reve
nue requirement. See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
Even if the Department recognized the source of the request, the possibility of charges
of confiscation may compel it to allow an increase. See supra note 24 and accompanying
text. In the original Ohio case, however, in which the court disallowed direct recovery of
abandonment costs, the United States Supreme Court dismissed an appeal on the ground
that the case did not present a proper federal question. Cleveland Elec. IlIum. Co. v. Office
of Consumers' Counsel, 455 U.S. 914 (1982). The Court's action may imply that the disal
lowance of abandonment costs, at least under the facts of Consumers' Counsel, does not
constitute confiscation in violation of the Constitution. But see Wilson, Ratemaking Treat
ment of Abandoned Generating Plant Losses, 8 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 343, 359-60
(1982). Consequently, Edison might have difficulty distinguishing between non-recovery of
imprudent costs characterized as rate of return and those characterized as operating costs.
See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
117. Consumers' Counsel v. Public Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 4 Ohio St. 3d Ill, 114-15,
447 N.E.2d 749, 753-54 (1983) (per curiam).
118. Id.
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percieved risk" 119 following the Ohio Supreme Court's decision to dis
allow the cost of four abandoned nuclear units. 120 The Ohio Supreme
Court acknowledged that, although the abandonment losses could not
be characterized as operating expenses under Ohio law, the PUC
could increase the company's rate of return based upon a factual find
ing of higher capital costs in reality produced by the non-recovery of
the losses. 121 The statutory bar against recovery for an investment that
never rendered service, therefore, was ineffective in protecting the
ratepayers. The same result may occur in the aftermath of Attorney
General with respect to imprudently incurred costs of abandonment.
Massachusetts now has legislation which moves toward prevent
ing imprudent expenditures on a power plant that will never go into
service. The particular legislation establishes an Energy Facility Siting
Council (EFSC).122 It provides that, once every five years, each elec
tric company must submit a long-range forecast predicting the needs
of its service area and describing its plans to meet the demand, includ
ing construction of new facilities. In addition, the company must up
date its forecast with an annual supplemental report embracing any
construction plans not embodied in previous forecasts. The agency
may then approve or reject the long-range forecasts and any supple
ments. 123 The electric utility need not present evidence of its ability to
finance the inspection or completion of any projects. Furthermore,
once the EFSC approves an initial plan for construction, its sanction
for continuation of the project is not necessary. 124 Under the statutory
framework, a state regulatory agency assumes a supervisory role over
the company's initial determination of the "convenience and public
necessity"125 of a proposed nuclear power plant and ongoing assess
ment of its service area needs. The scheme at a minimum requires
agency approval of plans to initiate a project and, therefore, evidences
119.

Id. at 114, 447 N.E.2d at 753.
Id. See supra notes 96-106 and accompanying text.
121. Consumers' Counsel v. Public Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 4 Ohio St. 3d Ill, 114-15,
447 N.E.2d 749, 753-54 (1983) (per curiam). See also Note, Public Utilities: The Black Fox
Nuclear Project Cancellation Dilemma: Of Judicial Review and Reform of Oklahoma's Ad
ministrative Process, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 190, 228 (1983).
122. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 69H (West 1976 & West Supp. 1984). The
statute grants the EFSC the authority to oversee the public necessity and environmental
aspects of an electric company's decision to add a new plant as well as to evaluate the
adequacy of current service. Id.
123. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, §§ 69I-69K (West Supp. 1984).
124. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.I64, §§ 691-69J (West Supp. 1984).
125. See Allison, supra note 64, at 286-98.
120.
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a greater ability to prevent imprudent costS.126
Although the statute grants an early supervisory role over all
projects planned after 1976,127 determination of forecasted need may
not suffice to eliminate imprudent decisions especially concerning nu
clear power facilities. Public utility managers have an economic incen
tive to prolong nuclear plant investment beyond the date of
imprudency in terms of ability to finance the project and continuing
need for the additional capacity. In general, the construction of a nu
clear power plant is capital intensive; 128 that is, huge amounts must be
invested to construct the facility. Once it comes on line, however, the
operating expenses are lower as compared to facilities which use other
sources of energy. 129 Utility managers look with favor upon nuclear
projects and may, therefore, continue to pursue completion impru
dently because the large capital costs will be included in their rate base
from which their profit will be computed. Thus, they achieve a greater
profit by undertaking and continuing, at all costs, a project which will
add relatively more to their rate base than other projects for which
construction is cheaper but operating expenses are higher. l3O As Attor
ney General illustrates, the need for the facility131 at or near its initia
tion may not be dispositive of the prudence of its construction. Prior
to Attorney General and the rate case which gave rise to it, the Depart
ment did investigate the need for Pilgrin II. It refused, however, to
126. Id.
With respect to Attorney General, however, the supreme judicial court in Plymouth
County Nuclear Information Comm. v. Energy Facilities Siting Council prevented the EFSC
from exerting authority over Edison's decisions to continue the Pilgrim II project because it
was under construction before the effective date of the legislation that created the EFSC.
The court said that the term "construction," which makes a facility subject to the earliest
possible regulatory supervision, should have the same meaning when used in connection
with the grandfathering of Edison's plans to build Pilgrim II. Plymouth County Nuclear
Information Comm. v. Energy Facilities Siting Council, 374 Mass. 236, 238-40, 372 N.E.2d
229, 231-32 (1978). Thus, the court relegated the Attorney General situation to the pru
dence/imprudence standard in order to protect the ratepayers. The Attorney General result
is the second best alternative as long as the Department remains aware of the possibility
that the company might attempt to recover a portion of the imprudent costs through claims
for a higher rate of return.
127. See supra note 126.
128. E. BERLIN, supra note 59, at xiii.
129. Allison, supra note 64, at 266.
130. W. CAPRON, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES 4-5
(1971).
131. The necessity of the facility, as determined in Attorney General and under the
EFSC, rests on whether the plant should be added in response to higher demand, lack of
sufficient reserve capacity, or displacement of oil as a resource. See In Re Boston Edison
Co., 46 Pub. Uti\' Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 433 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Uti\' 1982); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 164, §§ 691-J (West Supp. 1984).
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examine the company's ability to finance the project. 132 Later, the De
partment drew the line of imprudency earlier than the actual cancella
tion date even though the need for the facility may have continued. 133
Thus, the sole cause of the imprudently incurred costs seems to have
been the company's disregard in June, 1980, of the intolerably high
risk that it would not be able to complete the project. 134 Conse
quently, the legal system must force the company to become more re
alistic in its overall decisions concerning continuation of a nuclear
power plant project.
In light of the incentive to continue a nuclear plant project be
yond the point when it becomes imprudent and the realistic potential
that imprudent expenditures will eventually be charged to ratepayers,
the legislature should give the EFSC the power to examine periodi
cally the company's ability to finance construction during the life of
any nuclear plant project which it approves. Presently, the statute
grants the EFSC such authority over any oil company135 planning to
build a new oil facility at its initiation. 136 Since the EFSC is a separate
agency unburdened with the ratemaking tasks of the Department, pro
posed and ongoing nuclear plant projects should be made subject to
the same type of scrutiny as oil facilities. The massive amounts of
money required to build nuclear facilities justifies the intrusion of the
EFSC assuming a periodic supervisory role during the project. 137
132. In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 436-37 (Mass.
Dep't of Pub. Util. 1982). See supra note 71 and accompanying text. Subsequently, the
supreme judicial court acknowledged as appropriate the Department's restriction of its
scope of analysis during the life of the project as to the need and the relative cost of the
facilities. The court based its conclusion on the judicially created presumption of manage
ment's good faith in making decisions regarding the financeability of the project. 390 Mass.
at 229, 455 N.E.2d at 428.
133. See In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 451, 470
(Mass. Dep't of Pub. Util. 1982). See supra notes 71 & 78 and accompanying text.
134. See In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 470-71 (Mass.
Dep't of PUb. Util. 1982).
135. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 69G (West 1976 & West Supp. 1984).
136. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 691 (West Supp. 1984).
137. See supra notes 113-121 & 128-134 and accompanying text. Periodic supervi
sion, if granted by legislation, would not be in violation of any Constitutional provision. In
Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Chicago Great W. Ry. Co., 209 U.S. 108 (1908), the
United States Supreme Court reviewed the Interstate Commerce Commission's (ICC) or
der preventing Great Western from raising its rates for a specified class of freight custom
ers. Id. at 108-09. The Court reversed the ICC's order based partly on ICC's lack of
authority to substitute its judgment for that of the company's managers. Id. at 118-23.
Justice Brewer, writing for the Court, however, implied that the presumption of lawful and
right action by the company might be "overthrown by any legislation in respect to common
carriers." Id. at 120. Furthermore, the Court has recently stated that "Congress has left
sufficient authority in the States to allow the development of nuclear power to be slowed or
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CONCLUSION

In recent years, a variety of different methods have developed to
deal with the problem presented by the cancellation of nuclear power
plant projects. 138 Each approach has its own implications for the con
cerns of the ratepayers and the investors. The treatment may depend
on a wide range of legal and economic concepts which inhere in the
privately managed, publicly regulated utility industry. The statutory
model of regulatory control in each state may tip the balance between
partial or total recovery and disallowance of any recoupment. The
inconsistency, however, between disallowance of prudently incurred
costs of providing service and the legal mandate that the utility furnish
adequate service at the lowest cost is apparent. On the other hand, an
examination of management decisions regarding the initiation and
continuation of a nuclear power plant project after the company has
undertaken imprudent costs may not eliminate the flow-through of a
portion of these losses to the ratepayer, even though investors are offi
cially charged with them. Only legislation can prevent such a result.
The model of regulatory control over nuclear projects must be revised.
In nuclear power plant construction, price control is illusory if not
coupled with supervisory authority during the life of the project.
While some may balk at governmental examination of the manage
ment affairs of the utility, periodic supervision over nuclear plant con
struction would be advantageous. The prevention of imprudent costs
would end the problem created by the conflict between encouraging
efficient service and the indirect flow through of imprudent costs to
ratepayers.
Christine G. Brown

even stopped for economic reasons." Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,223 (1983) (Federal law did not preempt a
Californian statute requiring state regulatory approval of a nuclear waste disposal plan
prior to construction based on a concern for the likelihood of exorbitant cost of waste
storage resulting in the eventual shutdown of a particular nuclear power plant).
138. See supra notes 37-60 & 94-106 and accompanying text.

